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Abstract
In P2P networks, there are no incentives to cooperate. There is neither a reward for coop-
eration nor a punishment for non-cooperation. A distributed reputation system could solve this
problem, by giving means of managing trust towards other entities and discovering vicious en-
tities. The existing distributed reputation systems are based on plausibility considerations and,
thus, have several limitations. Therefore, in this report, we aim at overcoming these limitations
by proposing the Buddy System as a distributed reputation system that is based on social struc-
ture. For this purpose, we discuss the design space of social structures and choose an appropriate
social structure for the Buddy System. We consider implementation issues for its social structure
by taking into account the volatility of the P2P network. Finally, we show by the means of
simulation that the Buddy System signiﬁcantly improves the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of con-
ventional distributed reputation systems. More speciﬁcally, the Buddy System is more eﬀective in
the detection of vicious entities and does not introduce any additional communication overhead.
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1 Introduction
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks like KaZaA1, Morpheus2 or eDonkey3 are widely spread and fre-
quently in use throughout the internet4. Yet, all P2P systems are barely more than simple ﬁle
exchange programs for almost anonymous partners. The degree of cooperation relies on voluntary
participation and inoﬀensive behavior. No incentives or punishments are involved to ensure these
two crucial necessities of P2P networks.
A plausibility based distributed reputation system solves the above problems, by giving means
to rate other entities and share ratings with others. Hence, entities who try to exploit the network
can be identiﬁed and ignored for future transactions. A distributed reputation system improves
the degree of cooperation and furthermore ensures that the P2P networks is still functional. With
an increasing number of vicious entities, a P2P network that lacks a distributed reputation system
can easily perish. This is because well behaving entities have no motivation for participation if the
degree of cooperation declines too much. Distributed reputation systems can be used in virtually
any system of autonomous entities, such as P2P or ad hoc networks.
Still, distributed reputation systems are based on plausibility considerations and, thus, have to
cope with inherent limitations. For example, self-recommendations are not possible, the impact of
recommendation depends on one’s own reputation, and only the recommender is in charge of the
dissemination of trust values. Therefore, it seems necessary to introduce a paradigm that com-
plements the plausibility considerations. For this purpose, we propose the use of social structure.
The ensuing Buddy System combines the most suitable social structure and the functionality of
plausibility based distributed reputation system. It improves the detection of vicious entities and,
thus, increases the degree of cooperation.
This report is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the system model of distributed
reputation systems and state all assumptions for the Buddy System. Section 3 introduces social
structures for distributed reputation systems and P2P networks. The design of the Buddy System
is described in Section 4. The key algorithms for the social structuring are presented in Section 5
and the evaluation is shown in Section 6. Finally, we discuss the related work in Section 7 and
conclude this work in Section 8.
2 System Model of Distributed Reputation Systems
The considered system consists of autonomous entities that may cooperate in the course of trans-
actions. Each entity is autonomous and can therefore exhibit vicious behavior in any cooperation,
i.e., it defects. Each entity runs an independent instance of the reputation system and reports
any observed behavior to it. The instances of diﬀerent entities may cooperate by exchanging rec-
ommendations. The system model which is used here is described in more detail in [1]. Figure 1
illustrates the model.
Assumptions. The following assumptions are made for the remainder of the report:
• Strong identities: No entity can change its identity or disguise as someone else (spooﬁng).
1www.kazaa.com
2www.morpheus.com
3www.edonkey.com
4http://www.sharmannetworks.com/content/view/full/255
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Figure 1: Model of a distributed reputation system
• Transactions are made in pairs.
• No observation of transactions between other entities: When a transaction is done, only
the two participating entities know about the progress and outcome of that transaction.
No other entity can overhear the outcome. Overhearing the outcome of a transaction is
referred to as observation.
• Uncooperative behavior on lower protocol layers [2] is prevented.
• Conﬁdential channels for communication exist: Conﬁdential channels are important in P2P
and ad hoc networks, since a message is typically routed along other entities. By making use
of conﬁdential channels, the entities that forward the message cannot overhear or change
their content.
The restrictions that transactions can only be made in pairs and that no observation of other
transactions is possible, make the detection of defection more diﬃcult since no third party is
involved in any kind.
Volatility. P2P networks have to deal with the volatility of the system. Entities can join and
unlink at any time. No rules deﬁne how long an entity has to stay in the network or how often it
can join. Therefore, the total number of entities participating – at any time – is unpredictable.
Neither is, which entities are participating or for how long. These major ﬂuctuations of the
network have to be taken into account for a distributed reputation system and especially for its
social structure.
Trust and reputation. Trust and reputation must be deﬁned in the context of a reputation
system. We are using the trust deﬁnition of Gambetta [3]:
Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability
with which an agent will perform a particular action, both before [we] can monitor
such action (or independently of his capacity of ever to be able to monitor it) and in
a context in which it aﬀects [our] own action.
In the context of reputation systems, we interpret the term subjective probability as being only
the subjective probability of one agent, involving only personal experiences. Reputation shall be
mainly deﬁned as in [4]:
The Reputation [...] is the average trust of all other entities [...] reputation clearly
has a global aspect whereas trust is viewed from a local and subjective angle.
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We have to adjust some parts of this deﬁnition for the use in distributed reputation systems.
The term of all other is obviously not applicable, therefore it has to be interpreted as all other
– until then available – entities. This restriction decreases the global aspect of reputation to a
partly global aspect.
3 Social Structures for Distributed Reputation Systems
In real life, social structures are formed in order to achieve higher goals which would be impossible
for the individual to achieve, such as preventing crime or building a skyscraper. To uphold the
system, laws are enforced to ensure the rights of the individuals. For network communities whose
users have a high level of anonymity, special considerations have to be made. Furthermore, some
psychological and social ﬁndings should be discussed since they are applicable to P2P and ad hoc
networks. In the following, we provide an introduction to this topic. Subsequently, we point out
the speciﬁc issues that are relevant for ad hoc networks and, more generally, to P2P networks.
Finally, we discuss eﬀects of social structuring on distributed reputation systems.
3.1 An Introduction to Social Structure
The formation of groups has always been a crucial advantage for the human being. Because of
our ancestral need to belong, we are a group-bound species. The psychologists Turner and Hogg
pointed out that we identify ourself with certain social groups to state our individuality [5, 6]. For
example, we identify ourself as a student, a men, a catholic and so on. Within a group we favor
ingroup members and are sceptic towards strangers (the outgroup) [7]. We tend to cooperate
within a group even if no reward is oﬀered, just to strengthen the aﬃliation towards the group.
It seems reasonable to introduce social structure to P2P networks as well in order to strengthen
the aﬃliation towards the network. The obvious problem is the users’ anonymity in P2P networks.
The higher the degree of anonymity the easier it is to overcome our guilty conscience. In an
experiment of the New York University, it was shown that masked women used twice as much
electric shocks than did identiﬁable women [8]. Therefore, it seems doubtful that entities will
comply to group rules or even cooperate within a group. In contrast, the ingroup bias - the
tendency to favor one’s own group - holds even for an arbitrarily formed group. None of the so
formed group members knew each other and they did not have the chance to get to know each
other better. Still, when asked, they favored members of their “own” group [9, 10].
Group formation in P2P networks is a new area to investigate. Surely, none of these ﬁndings
can be directly applied to P2P networks. Still, in internet communities with almost anonym
members, the ingroup bias seems applicable as well. Therefore, there is a high probability that
the ﬁndings are, in some way, transferable to P2P networks as well.
3.2 Social Structures
For the discussion of social structures, it seems reasonable to identify their key characteristics
ﬁrst. The most important aspect is whether all entities are equal concerning their trustworthiness
or whether there exist dedicated entities that are inherently trustworthy and available. If such
entities exist, the exclusion of vicious entities from future transactions is quite straightforward.
As soon as a dedicated entity exposes a vicious entity, it can forward the information to all
other entities, who then refrain from any cooperation with that entity. In the absence of dedicated
entities, the exposure of a vicious entity becomes more complex since no absolute identiﬁcation
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can be done. The success of forwarding the identiﬁcation of a vicious entity depends on the level
of trust the receiver has for oneself. In the following, we take a closer look at social structures
that lack dedicated entities.
We distinguish the following characteristics of social structures: group size, entry and perma-
nent requirements of groups, symmetry of grouping, reason of grouping, and stimulus of grouping.
Note that all of the characteristics are orthogonal degrees of freedom for the design of social struc-
tures. This means that they are fully variable with each other.
Group size. Basically, there are two types of groups that are induced by the group size. Bi-
lateral groups are groups formed by two entities. No other entity can join this bilateral group.
Multilateral groups allow any number of members greater than two.
The larger the group is the harder is its maintenance. On the other hand, the more potential
transaction partners are part of the group. Apparently, these two properties have to be traded
oﬀ for the deﬁnition of the group size.
Entry requirements of groups. Entry requirements deﬁne under which circumstances an
entity is allowed to enter a group. We distinguish between between structural requirements and
group-speciﬁc requirements. Group-specific requirements are individually chosen by each group.
Therefore, we cannot provide any general statement for such entry requirements.
Structural requirements deﬁne whether a member of a group is allowed to be a member of
another group as well (joint grouping) or not (disjoint grouping). An example for disjoint grouping
consists of a group that is formed for the development of software and does not want any member
to join any other software development group. As for joint grouping, we can imagine a group
that is formed to exchange garﬁeld cartoons and has no interest to disallow their members to join
any other group.
Permanent requirements of groups. The permanent requirements of a group specify the
constraints that are valid for the group members. In general, the entry requirements are subsumed
by the group rules. In analogy to group-speciﬁc entry requirements, group-specific requirements
are individually chosen by each group. Inter-group requirements specify whether a group stipu-
lates that its group members exhibit some kind of behavior towards members of other groups.
For example, the software development group will probably be indiﬀerent if a developer behaves
viciously outside the group. If, on the other hand, the group is concerned that the reputation of
the project could be at risk, they might demand that the developer exhibits good behavior.
Symmetry of grouping. We distinguish between symmetric and asymmetric grouping. Sym-
metric grouping refers to the term that the involved parties mutually agree or disagree to engage
in some sort of grouping. In contrast, asymmetric grouping does not demand for such coordi-
nation of the involved parties. For example, this can be achieved by storing locally a list of
trustworthy entities without disseminating it. Symmetric grouping enforces a global view on the
network, while asymmetric grouping implicates a rather local view.
Reason of grouping. The main purpose of the formation of a group can be divided into two
categories: A group might aim at achieving a collective goal of the group, as it is true for the
software development group. Alternatively, the main purpose of the grouping is to support the
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group members in achieving their individual goals. For example, the individual utilities of the
group members could be increased by fostering cooperation among the group members.
Stimulus of grouping. The grouping may be deﬁned exogenously or adaptively. Exogenous
grouping ensues from a predetermined relationship between the entities. In such a case, the
entry and permanent requirements are not orthogonal to this degree of freedom since they are
predetermined as well. Adaptive grouping is performed according to some criteria of the social
system. In this work, we are focussed on adaptive grouping since it allows the design of such
criteria.
3.3 The Importance of Social Structure for Ad Hoc Networks
Most approaches only focus on how to identify vicious entities and not on how to attract well
behaving ones. Furthermore, another main aspect has to be how anonymity can be overcome in
order to give an incentive to cooperate. Overcoming anonymity is extremely crucial for volatile
networks like ad hoc networks because a group feeling encourages people to join the network. We
take the real life analogy of an airport. The more crowded with unknown persons a place is, the
higher the need to belong and stick to a group [7].
The introduction of social structures to ad hoc networks is does not only improve the detection
rate of vicious entities. In addition, the human nature is exploited in a way as well. Because of
the psychological need to belong, people are given an incentive to cooperate (”to do it for the
group”).
Despite of the psychological advantages, there are the technical advantages as well. The degree
of cooperation is increased through social structures. Furthermore, the detection rate of vicious
entities and higher goals can be achieved through social structures by combining resources.
User mobility does not impose any problems to a social structure. However, the partitioning
of the network might be a problem depending on the kind of group formations. If large groups
have to split because of the partitioning, the group cannot accept new members or exclude old
ones. This is because, for large groups, some kind of voting algorithm has to be processed in
order to do so. Note that bilateral grouping does not have those problems.
3.4 Interrelation of Social Structures and P2P Networks
Social structures provide means for improving degree of cooperation in P2P networks. If social
structures are formed, the members of a relationship may mutually grant privileges in some way.
Those privileges can be getting more resources from other members, being favored for transaction
demands or being actively warned about misbehaving entities. The degree of cooperation within
the overall system is increased, as vicious entities will be excluded. On the other hand, this
punishment is an incentive for members to cooperate. In order to join relationships, a high level
of trust is necessary, which can only be gained by successful transactions. Therefore, an incentive
for cooperation is given for newcomers.
Another reason why the degree of cooperation is increased is that members of a relationship
warn each other about misbehaving entities. If that entity is not a member of the relationship,
probably all other community member will refrain from making any more transactions with that
entity. Therefore, a vicious entity cannot exploit as many entities as in a P2P network without
social structure. Furthermore, the system has to prevent members of a relationship to defect
against non-members since the reputation of the members would be at risk.
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Figure 2: Limitations of existing reputation systems
With social structure, it becomes more diﬃcult for a vicious entity and even for a coalition
of vicious entities to exploit the system. A vicious entity by itself is less trusted than a member
of a relationship. In order to enter into a relationship, the vicious entity has to cooperate ﬁrst,
therefore providing services for others. If that entity misbehaves after entering into a relationship,
it gets excluded. In such a case, it adds more use to the P2P network then it can extract. Vicious
entities can form together a coalition in order to skip the initial cooperation part. Yet, since the
whole coalition is blamed for a defected transaction, all other vicious entities get less trustworthy
by just one transaction. Hence, it is harder for vicious entities to exploit other entities.
All these aspects focus more on the technical side of a social structure. The psychological
nature of a social structure probably has a high impact on the user as well. When a user is
part of a relationship, he feels involved and committed to the other members of the relationship.
Therefore, he has more reasons to cooperate and support other members, i.e., by staying longer
online.
3.5 Social Structures and Distributed Reputation Systems
As mentioned in the introduction, distributed reputation systems have to cope with inherent
limitations. We focus only on those that can be overcome by social structures. Figure 2 shows
some of the limitations that are mentioned and discussed in [1].
In distributed reputation systems, the individual trust levels are passed on in order to inform
other entities about personal experiences made. The entity which states the recommendation is
called recommender and the receiving entity is called recommendee.
One of the limitations is that self-recommendations are not meaningful since no entity would
spread negative information about oneself. With an underlying social structure, an entity can pass
on the information in which relationships it participates. Together with the information about
the number of relationship members and the entry requirements, an entity can convincingly state
its trustworthiness. This information can easily be veriﬁed by asking the other members of the
relationship.
Another limitation is that, for distributed reputation systems, the impact of a recommenda-
tion depends on the recommender’s reputation and its plausibility. With an underlying social
structure, the information about the recommender’s membership in relationships can improve
the trustworthiness of the recommendation. Therefore, the aﬃliation to a relationship can have
a large impact on a recommendation.
The last limitation discussed here is that solely the recommender is in charge of a dissemi-
nation. Since this involves spending resources, it is not preferable for an entity to recommend
frequently. This limitation can be overcome by stating that one of the relationship duties is that
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recommendations have to be passed on at certain time intervals or when signiﬁcant changes have
been made.
The limitations of existing distributed reputation systems are summarized as follows:
• Self-recommendations are not possible/meaningful.
• The impact of recommendations depends on the reputation of the respective recommender.
• Recommender is in charge of disseminating the recommendation.
4 Design of the Buddy System
The Buddy System is a contextualized distributed reputation system with a social structure.
In the following, we discuss its contextualization, its standard recommendation mechanism and
its social recommendation mechanism. The contextualization facilitates the use of the Buddy
System for diﬀerent transaction contexts. The standard recommendation mechanisms capture
the underlying distributed reputation system and how trust is stored and distributed. Finally,
we choose a social structure for the Buddy System.
4.1 Contextualization
For any reputation system which is not specialized on one exact purpose, contextualization is
crucial. In real life we trust our dentist and our mechanic, but we would never expect our dentist
to ﬁx a car.
The Buddy System distinguishes contexts regarding transaction value. For each transaction,
an entity determines the transaction value and reports the outcome of the transaction and its
value to the local instance of the reputation system. Therefore, for each transaction partner and
each transaction value, there exists a trust value. It supports the choice of trustworthy transaction
partners.
Each entity has full control over the contextualization and can combine diﬀerent transaction
values in groups as it wishes. The only restriction is that transaction value groups have to be
disjoint in order to enable reasonable exchange of recommendations. Individual contextualization
is extremely important for ad hoc networks where entities with diﬀerent kind of devices cooperate.
Entities with diﬀerent contexts can exchange their trust values by combining recursively two
transaction contexts into a new one. This is performed by taking the minimum trust value of
the underlying contexts. If the transaction context does not match a request, we choose the next
higher transaction context which fully includes the requested transaction context. By taking
the minimum value, a pessimistic approach is realized. Since the recommender has no exact
information about the requested context, he is not sure how the recommended entity will behave
in the new context. The recommender can only assume that it will correlate to one of the
underlying contexts. In order to avert overestimation, the minimum trust value is chosen. If the
approach was optimistic, gaining trust in one context could be suﬃcient to achieve trust in all
higher transaction contexts.
Figure 3 shows an example for this. At the lowest level, the transaction contexts of an entity
A are illustrated with the corresponding trust values for another entity B. In the context from 0 to
15, a trust of 2 is stored. If another entity C requests a recommendation, for example in context
[0,12), then this is a subcontext of [0,15) and entity A can submit the corresponding trust of 2.
If C requested a recommendation in the context [0,18) then none of the lowest level contexts of A
7
Figure 3: Exchange of Contexts
would match. Hence, entity A creates new contexts by combining the original context. Thereby,
the contexts [0,15) and [15,20) are combined into a new one, with the minimum trust of the
underlying trust values. Finally, entity A can submit the corresponding trust value to entity C.
4.2 Standard Recommendation Mechanism
4.2.1 Trust
Trust is stored and calculated in a straightforward manner. After each transaction, the outcome
and context of the transaction is reported to the local instance of the reputation system. It
calculates the new trust value for the entity. For this purpose, the following rules apply: After
a defected transaction an entity is downgraded. If the transaction was successful, increasing the
trust value depends on the current trust value and all recently successfully completed transaction
with this entity. For an upgrade 2trustvalue successfully completed transactions are needed. If
this is the case, the number of the transactions is decreased by that value and the trust value is
increased by one. For an upgrade from trust value 2 to trust value 3 a total of four successful
transactions is needed. For example entity A has a trust level of 3 of entity B. The successfully
completed transaction counter is set to 7. After the next transaction, the trust for Entity B is
increased to 4 and the counter is set back to zero. For the next upgrade 16 transactions are
needed.
4.2.2 Recommendations
We distinguish between direct and indirect recommendations. Direct recommendations only
include ﬁrst hand experiences of the recommender. In contrast, for indirect recommendations,
the recommender also considers recommendations of other entities. For the Buddy System, we
only make use of direct recommendations.
Hybrid recommendations are a mixture of direct and indirect recommendation. For the calcu-
lation of personal trust, available recommendations are taken into account. Therefore, the trust
value does not oﬀer a distinction between ﬁrst hand experiences and recommendations. If this
trust value is shared then this is a hybrid recommendation.
Direct recommendations. Direct recommendations are done in a straightforward manner.
Recommendations are sent on demand or after transactions. The receiving entity can weight
those recommendations according to the personal trust level towards the recommender. The
recommender trust is stored separately for all recommending entities. By this means, the recom-
mender trust can be recalculated if personal trust values change.
8
Indirect recommendations. Indirect recommendations have multiple disadvantages: mostly
the communication and computation overhead is increased dramatically. For indirect recommen-
dations, more requirements must be met. Every recommendation has to be non repudiable in
order to avoid changing the content. Further, every recommendation has to be attached with a
timestamp, because multiple recommendations from the same entity can exist in the network. In
order to reply to a recommendation request of an entity correctly, the personal trust value as long
as all indirect recommendations would have to be passed on. This would increase the cost of a
single message to O(n) (n=number of entities). Apart from the higher communication overhead,
the storage capacity of an entity has to be increased as well. This is a crucial aspect, since in an
P2P network probably not all entities have enough storage to manage indirect recommendations.
Moreover, the enhancement of indirect recommendations for the network is doubtful. Ob-
viously the number of recommendations an entity can obtain in a short time is increased, but
the recommendee can only evaluate those recommendation of the entities it knows from personal
experience. Recommendations of unknown entities should not be examined, since ﬁrst the en-
tity itself would have to be reviewed. For that direct communication would be necessary, and
therefore an indirect recommendation would not make sense.
For all of the above reasons indirect recommendations are not supported by the Buddy System.
Hybrid recommendations. Hybrid recommendations are diﬃcult to take into account. This
is because the trust value does not oﬀer a distinction between personal and recommended trust
and the receiver does not know the weightings the recommender used. Furthermore, indirect rec-
ommendations can spread uncontrollably if the recipient of a hybrid recommendation adjusts his
trust assessment and issues a further hybrid recommendation. This means that a recommenda-
tion about entity A can be taken into account twice: First, directly by the trust values of B and C
towards A. Second, if B recommends A to C the recommendation is taken another time indirectly
into account. Therefore, the Buddy System does not make use of hybrid recommendations.
4.3 Social Recommendation Mechanism
In the following, the social structure of the Buddy System is presented and the advantages of the
speciﬁc buddy structure are pointed out.
Choice of the social structure. The Buddy System is a distributed reputation system for
equal entities. In the following, the aspects introduced in Section 3.2 are discussed for the Buddy
System. Later in this section, each aspect is discussed in more detail
• Group size: only bilateral groups
• Entry requirements of groups:
– a minimum level of mutual trust
– similar ”views” of the network (see Section 5.1)
– none with regard to the number of group memberships (joint grouping)
• Permanent requirements of groups:
– Buddies have to favor each other.
– Buddies have to verify self recommendation checks.
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– After certain time intervals, the buddy relationship has to be veriﬁed again.
• Symmetry of grouping:
– The buddy relationships are symmetric
• Reason of grouping:
– Individual goals: Increase of the member’s individual utility by mutual cooperation
– Collective goals: Overcoming the limitations of conventional distributed reputation
systems.
• Stimulus of grouping:
– The stimulus of a buddy relationship is adaptive, depending on the speciﬁc needs of
the entity.
By this quite simple buddy structure, several limitations of distributed reputation systems
can be overcome. Self-recommendations are possible by stating the number of buddies the rec-
ommender has. Obviously the more buddies one entity has, the trustworthier it appears since it
has already proven to be trustworthy to those entities. With an increasing number of buddies,
the impact of an entity’s recommendation is increased as well because this entity has proven
trustworthy in the past.
In conclusion, the volatile nature of the buddy relationships matches the nature of P2P net-
works.
Management of the social structure. The number of buddies that one entity can have is not
limited. A buddy relationship is formed when both entities agree to do so. It can be ended at any
time by one of the entities without speciﬁc reason given. An annulment of a buddy relationship is
realized as soon as one entity requests the annulment and the other entity conﬁrms the request.
Problems can arise if the partner buddy refuses the annulment simply by ”playing dead”. In
this case, it is diﬃcult to reconstruct what happened. The partner buddy might have deliberately
refused to send an acknowledgement or it is simply out of reach or its device is turned oﬀ. Diﬀerent
approaches can be pursued:
1. Immediate cancellation: The buddy relationship is cancelled without any acknowledge-
ment. Tradeoﬀ: the other entity might end up as a liar.
2. Lazy cancellation: The buddy relationship is cancelled when the buddies enter into their
next transaction.
3. Timeouts: After a certain time interval the buddy relationship is cancelled if not conﬁrmed
otherwise.
4. Third-party mediation: On next buddy examination of another entity, conﬁrm request,
but demand other entity to pass on the annulment request.
New problems arise from the latter approach. If still no acknowledgement is obtained, we
are in doubt which entity defected. Nevertheless, the Buddy System uses a combination of
lazy cancellation and third-party mediation to cope the problems of annulment. The further
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implications of third-party mediation are ignored since it is assumed that the problems will not
arise frequently. Lazy cancellation alone is suﬃcient if both buddies are within reach since it is
assumed that buddies are often participating in transactions. Third-party mediation is added to
cope with partitioning of the network. If a buddy examination reaches an entity, it knows that
the network is either reunited (then we can still uses lazy cancellation) or that the requester will
soon be able to reach the buddy. The latter can only be the case if the requester is highly mobile
and moves between two partitions. Since this case will not arise frequently, we use an optimistic
approach when using third-party mediation.
For self-recommendations, the number of buddies is stated in order to indicate one’s own
trustworthiness. Therefore, checking the accuracy of the stated number of buddies is crucial. For
such check, the supposed buddies are requested for the conﬁrmation of their relationship with
the self-recommender. Alternatively, such check may be probabilistic by randomly checking just
a few buddies. In the Buddy System, the following approach is realized: A rather small number
of buddies are veriﬁed in order to keep the communication overhead small. For the evaluation of
the recommendation, three outcomes are possible: 1) all requested buddies conﬁrm so that the
total number of stated buddies is used, 2) some buddies were not available, so the total number
of stated buddies is reduced by the percentage of those not answering compared to those who
conﬁrmed, 3) at least one buddy declines the relationship with the self-recommender so that the
number of buddies is set to zero and the recommender is informed.
The permanently evolving Buddy System is harder to overview than any other social structure
since every entity only knows a very speciﬁc part of the system. In order to get an overview, the
buddies of every entity would have to be processed into a table. This is very costly and time
intense. Hence, the Buddy System refrains from doing so. The other way round, this is another
advantage of the Buddy System since, for a vicious entity, it is hardly possible to identify the
actual structuring and advance against certain groups of entities.
Recommendations in the social structure. Recommendations are issued on request. There-
fore, getting recommendation is no longer solely in hands of the recommender. Note that no active
warning of defectious entities is achieved. This is done out of two reasons: First the communica-
tion overhead is reduced and second each entity can choose its own level of risk averseness. Active
warning mechanisms could be abused in the fashion of an denial-of-service attack. Furthermore,
an entity might not be interested in being warned, e.g., because the warning’s context appears
to be irrelevant for its speciﬁc needs. Nevertheless, a risk-averse entity may still obtain many
recommendations by actively requesting them.
5 Social Algorithms in the Buddy System
In this section, we present two algorithms that are used for the social structuring in the Buddy
System.
5.1 Choice of Buddies
procedure checkForBuddy(possiblePartner)
1: allPeople← getAllKnownPeople()
2: while (allPeople.hasMoreElements()) do
3: currentPerson← allPeople.nextElement()
4: myTrust← getTrust(currentPerson)
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5: hisTrust← getRecommendTrustFrom(possiblePartner, currentPerson)
6: if (myTrust = 0 & hisTrust = 0) then
7: diff ← calculateDifferences(myTrust, hisTrust)
8: distance← distance+ diff
9: users← users+ 1
10: else
11: Ignore
12: end if
13: if checkForDiﬀerence(myTrust, hisTrust) then
14: difference← difference+ 1
15: end if
16: end while
17: if ( (distance < config1) & (users > config2) & (difference > config3) ) then
18: RETURNtrue
19: else
20: RETURNfalse
21: end if
This algorithm describes what is veriﬁed for a buddy relationship. Before the procedure is
called the trust value for the requester is veriﬁed. For all known entities (trust value = 0 ) the
trust values are compared. All diﬀerences are added up (distance), the total number of compared
entities is stored (users) and the total number of diﬀerences (differences). If all requirements
are met, the request is accepted. The verifying of diﬀerences is used because buddies should have
equal or almost equal views of the network to avoid later conﬂicts. The config1 − 3 values can
be set individually depending on the risk awareness of the entity.
5.2 Choice of Transaction Partners
The following algorithm is not a reputation system issue. Rather, it illustrates how the Buddy
System can be used to support the transaction decision process.
procedure getBestPartner()
1: allPartners← GetAllKnownPartners()
2: while (allPartners.hasMoreElements()) do
3: currentPartner ← allPartners.nextElement()
4: calculateRecommendTrust(currentPartner)
5: checkIfBuddy(currentPartner)
6: end while
7: sortedList← sortPartnersByTrustLevels(allPartners)
8: returnRandomElement(sortedList)
This straightforward algorithm shows how transaction partners are chosen. A list of all entities
is created, sorted by trust values. Buddies receive an additional bonus. Then randomly, one of
those entities are chosen for a transaction. If that entity is not available, it is deleted from the
list and the next one is chosen. The probability of being chosen declines logarithmic. Therefore,
the most trusted entity is chosen with a probability of 50%, the second one with probability 25%
and so on... This algorithm is also applied if there is a queue for requested transactions. By this
means, the rights and duties of buddies are enforced as well since buddies are sorted at the top
of the list and are therefore preferred. The probability that one of the ﬁrst 6 entities is chosen is
over 98%, which seems unreasonable regarding the possibly large network. As long as the entities
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are available and cooperate, this makes perfect sense because, for an entity, the outcome of a
transaction is most important. If an entity defects (possibly unvoluntarily), the trust value is
decreased and the probability of being chosen declines. Then, other entities get the chance to
prove their trustworthiness.
6 Evaluation of the Buddy System
In this section, we take a closer look at the evaluation of the Buddy System. This includes a
brief discussion of the implementation issues. Based on the implementation, the test scenarios
and test results are presented.
6.1 Implementation issues
The implementation of the Buddy System was done in the context of the DIANE Project of the
University of Karlsruhe. For the implementation of the Buddy System, the following decisions
have been made:
• The scale of trust values was set from -7 to 8.
• A trust value of 0 indicates an unknown entity.
• The trust values -7 and 8 indicate static trust or distrust.
• ∑ni=0 abs(xi − yi) < k and a minimum trust of 4 must be fulﬁlled to enter a buddy-
relationship.
• The rate for buddy review upon self-recommendation was set to 10%.
• Transaction contexts were only value based. No semantic contexts were used.
• Recommendational trust is stored as decimal place.
The trust scale is set from -7 to 8, whereby 0 indicates unknown entities and -7 receptively
8 denotes static trust. Static Trust [2] refers to the idea that an entity can set the trust level of
another entity to a unchangeable value. Hereby, an entity which knows another entity from real
life could set the trust to 8. The reputation system cannot change that value. Only the entity
itself can set the value back to a dynamic value, which is changeable by the reputation system.∑n
i=0 abs(xi − yi) < k is the formula for buddy-relationships. x and y denote the two entities
that are requesting for a buddy-relationship. xi is the trust level entity x has about entity i, abs
denotes that the absolute value is taken into account. k refers to the minimum distance that
the buddy requestor must have in order to enter an relationship. This depends obviously on all
known entities and is set by default on all entities divided by two. The algorithms of Section 5.1
is applied for this purpose.
6.2 Simulation Runs
We have used the benchmark group IBR2 5. The instances of the benchmark group diﬀer in the
network’s volatility and the ratio between cooperative and vicious entities. Vicious entities always
5The detailed description of the benchmark group IBR2 is found in the Appendix A.
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Figure 4: Individual gains and costs for the Buddy System (IBR2a benchmark)
defect in the course of transactions, whereas cooperative entities only enter into transactions
with rather trustworthy entities. There are two types of vicious entities, i.e., uncooperative and
colluding entities. In contrast to the uncooperative entities, colluding entities make active use of
the Buddy System by mutually forming buddy relationships.
The simulation has been run three times with each of the ﬁve IBR2 instances. First, without
any reputation system. Second, with the Buddy System that had its social structure inactivated.
Therefore, it was merely a regular distributed reputation system (DRS). The third run was
performed for the Buddy System that had its standard recommendation mechanism inactivated.
By this means, we are able to compare the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of standard and social
recommendation mechanisms.
Figure 4 illustrates how the test runs were examined. For each user the individual gains and
costs out of all transactions was determined. As the ﬁgure shows, uncooperative and colluding
users did not have any costs since they always defect in the course of transactions. The costs and
gains of the cooperative users varied depending on how long they stayed online. Even though the
uncooperative and colluding entities stay online the entire time, their gains are less than those of
cooperative entities.
This becomes even clearer if we subtract the entities which were only online for a short time.
The uncooperative entities are discovered very eﬀectively since they cannot pull out much proﬁt.
This is shown in Figure 5. At the end of each simulation run, the correlation of the individual
costs and gains is calculated. The ensuing coeﬃcient of correlation indicates the degree of linear
relationship of individual gains and costs. Furthermore, a positive correlation shows that the gain
increases with rising costs, whereas a negative correlation implies that vicious entities can gain
more than cooperative ones. We conclude that the coeﬃcient of correlation measures the fairness
of the reputation system6. In the following, we focus on such coeﬃcient in order to obtain an
aggregated view of the simulation results.
6A more detailed analysis of this means of evaluation can be found in our previous work [11].
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Figure 5: Revised individual gains and costs for the Buddy System (IBR2a benchmark)
Colluders. As Figure 4 shows, colluding users are less eﬃcient in exploiting the network then
regular uncooperative ones. This ﬁnding has to be explained in more detail since it represents
a crucial advantage of the Buddy System. Colluding entities participate in buddy relationships
but they do not make transactions with each other. Therefore, they try to exploit the self-
recommendation mechanism of the Buddy System. When a new entity enters the network, the
colluders can self recommend and therefore seem trustworthy for the newcomer. At ﬁrst, colluders
attract newcomers. Nevertheless, this is an acceptable tradeoﬀ since after one colluder defects the
whole group is downgraded. Therefore, colluders can be eﬃciently discovered. This is essential
to the robustness of the Buddy System.
Correlation for diﬀerent benchmarks. Figure 6 gives an overview of the eﬀectiveness of the
Buddy System. Apparently, without any distributed reputation system (DRS), correlation and
therefore the eﬀectiveness is at a very low level. The introduction of the standard recommendation
mechanism of the Buddy System yields an improvement of the correlation. It is further increased
by the application of the social recommendation mechanism of the Buddy System. Even though
the improvement does not seem signiﬁcant at ﬁrst sight, it is quite remarkable. Since the standard
recommendation mechanism already are at the top 80-90%, further improvement is exceptional.
On the average, the social recommendation mechanism improves the eﬀectiveness of the standard
recommendations by another 15-20%.
In benchmark IBR2c, which consists of 15 uncooperative, 15 colluding and only 10 coopera-
tive users, the eﬀectiveness of the social recommendation mechanism outperforms the standard
recommendation mechanism by far. Still, there is no high correlation since there are too many
vicious entities.
Newcomers. The success of newcomers is another very important aspect of how eﬃcient a
reputation system is. In the initial phase where no entity knows any other, it is easier for vicious
entities to exploit cooperative users. After transactions occurred among most of the entities,
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Figure 7: The number of unsuccessful transactions for newcomers (IBR2a benchmark)
newcomers should be warned eﬃciently. The warning of newcomers can only be achieved with
an underlying social structure. Otherwise, recommendations would not be meaningful since the
newcomers do not know how to weight the recommendations. In the Buddy System, cooperative
entities can self-recommend by stating the number of their buddies, whereas uncooperative users
cannot do so since they do not participate in buddy relationships. Therefore, it is more likely
that newcomers choose cooperative users than uncooperative users.
Figure 7 shows how eﬀective the warning of newcomers is for the IBR2a benchmark. At
the beginning, most cooperative entities have not yet been able to form buddy relationships.
Therefore, no signiﬁcant self-recommendation can be done. At the end of the simulation run, the
recommendations are more meaningful so that the overall failed transaction ratio drops. At the
beginning, an average newcomer is involved in 7.4 unsuccessful transactions. At the end of the
run, this number is decreased to 4. This is especially remarkable since transaction partners are
randomly chosen and colluders are self-recommending as well. Because of the random factor, the
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lines are not straight but ﬂuctuate.
Messages. In order to assess the overhead of standard and social recommendation mechanisms,
we compare the number of sent messages for diﬀerent recommendation mechanisms in Figure 8.
It shows that the number of overall messages of social recommendation mechanisms is about
10–15% higher. Note that, for standard recommendation mechanism, recommendations are sent
either after a successful transaction or before entering into a transaction with a prior unknown
entity. For the social recommendation mechanism of the Buddy System, recommendations are
exchanged before entering into a buddy relationship and self-recommendations are requested when
encountering a prior unknown entity.
Figure 9 breaks down the number of sent messages into three classes: recommendations, self-
recommendations and maintenance messages. Recommendations are standard recommendations
as used in any distributed reputation system. Note that the social recommendation mechanisms
of the Buddy System cannot do completely without such recommendations since this is the most
eﬀective way to test whether the potential buddies’ views of the world are likewise. Still, two enti-
ties only exchange recommendations if they are about to become buddies. In any other situation,
self-recommendations are obtained in order to examine an entities trustworthiness. Maintenance
messages are messages sent either when requesting someone to become a buddy or checking
whether a claimed buddy relationship actually exists. Note that recommendation messages are
hybrid in the way that they have a twofold purpose: Mainly, they enable the calculation of the
buddy requirements. But since they have to be obtained anyway, the recommendational trust is
calculated and stored as well. Figure 9 shows that self-recommendations are sent most often.
In Figure 10, we consider the size of the sent messages. For this purpose, we make the following
assumptions: Every entity has on average one quarter of the system’s entities as buddies. This
assumption overestimates the size of buddy messages since such number of buddy relationships
can be hardly achieved. This is because ﬁrst enough trust towards the other entity must be
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Figure 9: Messages of the social recommendation mechanism of the Buddy System
established, which assumes that the other entity is cooperative and a transaction has been made.
In addition, the recommendation size is underestimated since it is assumed that the entity only
knows half of all entities. A further assumption is that the identiﬁer of an Entity consists of 20
bit, which would limit the overall network size to one million users. The size of a transaction
context was evaluated to 11 bit which would represent a transaction value of maximum of 1024.
Since an interval rather then a concrete value is requested we need the 11th bit. Further, the
trust value needs 4 bits. Maintenance messages are very small in size since they only consist of
one entity ID. Maintenance messages either checks whether an entity is a buddy or, if someone
else wants to become a buddy, requests a standard recommendation for the computation of the
similarity of world views. Therefore, the costs - in bits - of all messages are: (n represents the
number of all entities)
• Self Recommendations: n/4 * 20
• Regular Recommendations: n/2 * (20 + 11 + 4)
• Maintenance Messages: 20
With these assumptions, we calculate the total costs. They are shown in Figure 10. The
size is measured in KBytes. Apparently, the overall costs for the messages of the social recom-
mendation mechanism are far less than for the standard recommendation mechanism. This is
because standard recommendations are far more expensive. Note that, even aside the speciﬁc
assumptions regarding the relative number of buddies, the size of a standard recommendation
can be always assumed at a minimum of twice the size of a self-recommendation. This is because
every entity knows obviously more entities than it has buddies. Furthermore, the mere size of a
recommendation is a least 35 bits, while a self recommendation only need 20 bits.
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Summary. The scenarios show that even the standard mechanisms of the reputation system
signiﬁcantly improve the degree of cooperation. The social structure of the Buddy System further
enhances the eﬀectiveness of the reputation system. It is crucial that the Buddy System has a
high robustness. This means that the social structure can not be exploited by vicious entities.
Furthermore, even since the total number of messages increases, the total costs for all messages
decreases, since self recommendations are less expensive. Overall, the performance is increased
by 15–20%, while the overall cost for messages is decreased.
7 Related Work
7.1 Existing Distributed Reputation Systems without Social Structures
Many approaches have been made designing and improving reputation systems [12, 13, 14, 4, 15,
2].
Probably one of the best known distributed reputation system is the CONFIDANT Proto-
col [13]. CONFIDANT is the abbreviation for “Cooperation Of Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic
Ad-hoc NeTworks” and is used to detect misbehaving entities. An entity consist of a monitor, a
reputation system, a trust manager and a path manager. Each entity can monitor the packages
sent to and from neighboring entities. Thereby, entities can detect misbehaving entities, and re-
port this to the reputation system. If a certain threshold is reached, the path manager is used to
route packages around the misbehaving entity and ignore further requests. Further, an ALARM
is triggered to inform others about the misbehaving entities. The receiver of an ALARM messages
examines it through the trust manager to verify it’s trustworthiness. Signiﬁcant improvement in
throughput can be achieved.
Another well known approach is the CORE (collaborative reputation mechanism) mecha-
nism [15]. Similar to the Monitoring Unit of the CONFIDANT Protocol, a watchdog unit is
used, to overhear the messages sent from other entities. The reputation system diﬀerentiates be-
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tween personal experience, recommendations and a functional reputation value, which represents
some sort of context aware value.
Diﬀerent approaches have been made to improve distributed reputation systems [12, 14].
Dellarocas introduces a clustering approach to ﬁlter false praises [14]. Through the robust
algorithm a high detection rate of colluding entities can be maintained. Buchegger uses a sta-
tistical approach to identify misbehaving entities [12]. The Bayesian algorithm uses the number
of suspected misbehaving and well behaving entities as input for the beta function of a binomial
equal distribution.
7.2 Existing Distributed Reputation Systems Based on Social Structures
Despite of all the approaches to improve distributed reputation system, some limitations can not
be overcome by simple statistical means. These limitations are discussed in detail in [1] and have
been partly examined in Section 4.
Miranda and Rodrigues designed a distributed reputation system for routing purposes [16].
Each entity has three variables: friends, the entities it cooperates with, foes, the entities is
refuses service too and selfish, which includes entities which treat oneself as a foe. Theses
variables are exchanged with other entities. Messages can be overheard, and if no messages are
heard from an entity for some period of time all information will be deleted. This poses the major
disadvantage of this approach, since identiﬁed foes will not be recognized when they reenter the
network. Nevertheless, the friends-and-foes reputation system represents an interesting approach
since it makes use of social structures. It applies multilateral groups which aim at achieving
individual goals. The entry requirements are good behavior. There are no further permanent
requirements. Note that the grouping issue is dealt in a personal rather than a global view.
By this means, each entity denotes its own friends and foes (by subjective means), which can be
asymmetric. This means that the other entity doesn’t necessary have to think the same way. Since
the friends and foes lists are distributed to others, the relationships should become eventually
symmetric.
To our knowledge, the work of Buskens and Weesie [17] represents the only approach that
explicitly considers both social structure and distributed reputation systems. For this purpose,
the authors assume a social structure that is bilateral, joint, exogenous, and asymmetric. The
reason of grouping is collective since it aims at the identiﬁcation and isolation of untrustworthy
entities. In order to facilitate a game theoretic analysis of such a setting, the authors make
restricting assumption with respect to the system model: (1) There exists an entity (so-called
trustee) that is proposed transactions with other entities (so-called trustors). (2) The issuance
and reception of recommendations may only include the trustors of two subsequent transactions.
In addition, a trustor only recommends probabilistically to the members of the groups that it
belongs to. (3) Every recommendation is truthful. (4) The transaction peers have perfect
information of their incentives to defect. Based on these assumptions, the authors analyze the
impact of diﬀerent social structures on the eﬀectiveness of the reputation system. In this regard,
they provide guidelines for the deﬁnition of exogenous social structures.
8 Conclusion
P2P networks are frequently in use, still the network relies solely on altruistic users. No incentives
or punishments are given to enforce cooperation. A distributed reputation system combined with
a social structure improves the P2P network and assures its mere existence. In this report, the
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notion of distributed reputation systems has been introduced. An introduction to the psycholog-
ical aspects of social structure has been given. Furthermore, the advantages of social structures
for P2P networks have been pointed out. Emphasis has been laid on the design space of social
structures and their adjustment to the volatile nature of a P2P network. We discussed the design
of the Buddy System as a distributed reputation system that is based on social structure. We
showed how it overcomes the limitations of conventional distributed reputation systems. By the
means of simulation, we have shown that the Buddy System improves the degree of cooperation
and therefore the overall quality of a P2P network. Furthermore, the robustness of the Buddy
System has been shown.
In the future, we will examine the impact of non-repudiable tokens [1] on the Buddy System.
By this means, the eﬀectiveness of the Buddy System could be further improved.
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Appendix A
Benchmarks
1 IBR2
This benchmark group is characterized by the following:
• Each entity runs the same components that are conﬁgured the same.
• The population is ﬁxed at 50 devices that are mutually always reachable.
• Only cooperative, uncooperative, and colluding devices take part.
• Colluding devices form exactly one collusion. The members of a collusion mutually set
static trust values in order to promote each other.
• The life-cycle of cooperative devices is as follows: They enter the network, participate in
some transactions and ﬁnally leave the network. In order to keep the population ﬁxed at
50 devices, a cooperative device enters the network whenever another cooperative device
leaves.
• Transactions are performed according to the barter trade pattern. No exchange protocols
are used. Furthermore, it is assumed that each entity has to decide whether to execute
its action before it knows about the behavior of its transaction partner (PD-game). The
transaction context is a general one.
• Each transaction peer is able to fully perceive whether the transaction partner defected or
not. By this means, the perception is without noise.
• This benchmark group assumes that a user is asked whenever a bilateral transaction with
an other entity would make sense. Only if both users agree to such a transaction, it is
performed. For this purpose, each peer may deﬁne whether it defects in the course of that
transaction. At last, each peer is informed of the outcome of the transaction. This means
that a transaction represents a prisoner dilemma game.
• For each transaction, an entity can choose among three entities (=possible transaction
partners).
• The set of possible transaction partners is chosen randomly. By this means, there is no pre-
deﬁned locality of cooperation behavior. Yet, the entities’ choice of transaction partners
should provide for locality.
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• Every device of the population is always online.
• The gain-cost-ratio is 3.
• The entities are risk neutral.
Bench- #coop #uncoop #collud. #trans- entrance
mark Users Users Users actions rate
IBR2a 35 10 5 5000 100
IBR2b 35 0 15 5000 100
IBR2c 10 15 15 5000 100
IBR2f 35 10 5 10000 100
IBR2i 35 10 5 5000 30
Cooperative users, uncooperative users and colluding users: This benchmark group
makes use of the transacting user. Cooperative users cooperate if the valuated gain is higher
than the costs of the transaction (they never defect). Uncooperative ones always participate and
defect in transactions. Colluding ones always participate and defect in transactions with entities
that are not member of the collusion.
The choice of transaction partners is as follows: Cooperative users choose the most trusted
entity, whereas uncooperative/colluding users choose randomly.
Overall transactions: It indicates the number of proposed transactions. The entity that is
proposed a transaction is chosen pseudo-randomly.
Entrance rate: Speciﬁes how many transactions are proposed before a cooperative user leaves
and another enters.
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